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The delivery of air transportation services relies on the collaboration of a complex value
chain. The primary stakeholders span the spectrum from end user (travelers and shippers)
to service provider (airlines) and equipment manufacturer (aircraft integrators) while it
includes enabler stakeholders (regulators, financiers and aircraft lessors). The interactions
among these stakeholders and their collective response to external shocks have
historically generated an industry that is notoriously cyclical.
This cyclicality comes at a price for shareholders, employees, and users. Historically, the
industry-wide rate of returns on investment has been very low with the most recent losses
erasing in nominal terms the total profits since the beginning of the industry. Employees
in the airline or aircraft manufacturing sectors are, of course, affected by the intense
hire/fire cycle1. As an indicative example, Boeing’s workforce has fluctuated from more
than 100,000 employees in 1967 to less than 40.000 in 1971, just four year later or a
layoff rate of about 15,000 a year. Similarly, between 1992 and 1995, the layoff rate was
about 7,000 employees a year ((Boeing 2005) and previous years, (Pope and Nyhan
2001)). The growth periods, while good for newly hired employees, are far from trouble-
free; efforts to ramp-up production can backfire which was illustrated by the 1997 $2.6B
write-offs by Boeing and the consequent stock tumble when several production lines had
to temporarily shut down unable to meet the ambitious production targets due to lack of
parts (Newhouse 2007). The resultant periodic over- and under-capacity creates issues for
the planning of airports and air-traffic control capacity while passengers perceive (and
receive) inconsistent levels of service (LOS) and pricing between periods. In summary,
there are economic and societal costs involved with such cycles and mitigating their
effects can provide benefits for the majority of the involved stakeholders.
In this paper we explore the relative effectiveness of a diverse set of strategic alternatives
to mitigate the effects of the business cycle in commercial aviation and by doing so
improve the long-term position of both the stakeholder that takes action as well as the
aviation enterprise as a whole. Using simulation experiments, we find that such
“symbiotic” alternatives exist even in the face of deregulated highly competitive markets.
The key for unlocking the symbiotic potential lies, in this case, with the aircraft
manufacturers as a central and consolidated node in the aviation value chain. A winning
strategic alternative dictates that both the two remaining large commercial aircraft (LCA)
manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus, maintain a policy of slow rather than quick response
to the orders received by airlines. There are combinations of strategic alternatives that
improve the outcome but the above is shown to be both robust and feasible.
This paper starts by presenting a review of the industry cycles literature in Section 1 that
summarizes the hypotheses about the causal effects that drive the generation of cycles.
Section 2 presents how the specific characteristics of the aviation industry can drive the
                                                 
1 The hire/fire cycle is of interest as it varies by firm as we shall see in Section 2.
2aviation industry cycle and lists specific strategic alternatives that would address these
drivers. Section 3 describes the commercial aviation simulation model that was
developed to reproduce historical cyclical dynamics and project them into the future.
Finally, Section 4 presents the strategic alternatives considered and the results of the
experiments conducted to identify the relative effectiveness of how the different
alternatives perform in mitigating the negative impacts of the aviation business cycle.
1. Economic, Industrial and Supply Chain Cycles
The business cycle for an industry can be loosely defined as a recurring non-seasonal
variation in output that is usually accompanied by correlated changes in characteristic
measures including profitability, equipment utilization, employment etc2. For most
industries there is a correlation between economy-wide cycles and the industry-specific
ones and few, if any, industries could claim immunity from the business cycle3.
The observation that industry cycles are correlated to economy-wide cycles led
economists to study how the different industries and economic functions interacted to
produce the observed oscillations. Economic literature on business cycles traces back to
the early 19th century and so does the theoretical basis for its causes. Among the recurring
themes found in these hypotheses, external shocks and mass market psychology are the
more prominent ones. The effect of external shocks as the reason for why economies
oscillate was first submitted by Jevons in the late 19th century when he suggested that
sunspot activity coincided with economic cycles. Although Jevon’s conjecture was soon
discredited, external shocks to a system remain a key initial hypothesis for explaining
economy cycles. Pigou was among the first to suggest that the psychology of investors
that make self-reinforcing errors of optimism and subsequent errors of pessimism4, an
internal rather than an external force, can also be considered as a driving force for the
business cycle (Pigou 1929).
Most of the hypotheses that were proposed in order to explain business cycles are
variants or refinements of these two ideas. Yet there are other contributing factors, for
example, the lack of perfect information and the inability to forecast accurately as
proposed by Metzler Abramovitz (Metzler 1941) (Abramovitz 1950). Imperfect
information and delays between action and effect lie at the center of the mechanism
called the “cobweb theorem;” it was described by Kaldor in order to explain commodity
                                                 
2 One more formal definition of the business cycle for the economy given by Burns and Mitchell: “a type of
fluctuation found in the aggregate activity of nations that organize their work mainly in business
enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions [,] recessions, contractions and revivals which merge into the
expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic…”
3 In fact, cyclicality is considered integral to capitalistic economies by theorists. Schumpeter (1939), an
economist who studied the macroeconomic cycles intensively, proclaimed that “[c]ycles are not, like
tonsils, separable things that might be treated by themselves, but are, like the beat of the heart, of the
essence of the organism that displays them.”
4 Pigou noted that bankruptcies are not very effective in destroying capital, as the capital investments
simply changes owners but instead, he suggested, it is fear of undertaking new investments that delays the
optimal allocation of resources to be prepared for the next cycle.
3market cycles (Ezekiel 1938). Commodity producers, the theorem went, can only
perceive the prices in the market; as the prices for a given commodity are high and absent
coordination every producer will spontaneously rush to fill that “opportunity” but they
will not be able to discover this until the next year’s crop is supplied and the market glut
depresses the prices. Albeit idealized, this is a good description of how markets with
multiple competing actors and large delays react even today.
Unlike commodities for which the production/consumption cycles are fairly short,
durable goods like automobiles, ships and aircraft have a longer useful life. This
characteristic implies that if for some reason there is a spike in the demand for a durable
widget, this spike in orders will tend to be reproduced when the durable widgets
delivered in a wave reach the end of their useful life in what was termed a reinvestment
cycle.
Tinbergen was the first to describe the “durable goods” cycle in the Norwegian shipping
industry in 1931. He attributed the cyclicality in the orders to delayed feedback between
orders and rates (Tvedt 2003). When freight rates increased orders followed, yet as the
delay of construction intervened, freight rates could reach very high levels triggering
even more orders for ships. Expectedly, when the orders materialized they could create a
glut and even a depression in cycles.
Continuing the research in the shipping industry, Einarsen  observed a reinvestment cycle
but he also noted that since the useful life of machinery can be extended through repairs,
capital replacement should be elastic. This would imply the existence of what he called
the secondary reinvestment cycle. These cycles “owe their existence to the fact that the
replacement of the machinery, which during depression becomes ripe for renewal, will to
a great extent be neglected or postponed” (Einarsen 1938). Therefore, he expected the
reinvestment cycles to synchronize with the economic cycle as the new orders plus the
replacements can be delayed until the post-recession growth.
Tinbergen’s observations on the oscillation-inducing effect of the delay between orders
placed by shipping companies and deliveries by shipyards pointed to a key mechanism of
a phenomenon characterizing multi-tier supply chains known as the “bullwhip effect.”
The bullwhip effect was defined by Forrester as “the amplification of order variation
moving upstream in the supply chain” (Forrester 1961). This effect has been observed in
diverse supply chains (with examples including baby diapers (Lee, Padmanabhan et al.
1997), pasta (Hammond 1994), and even found in the difference between inbound and
outbound inventories of a single warehouse (Svensson 2003).
Industry level observations have confirmed similar effects in the automotive industry
(Blanchard 1983), the machine tool industry (Anderson, Fine et al. 2000), and in the
electronics industry (Terwiesch, Ren et al. 2005). In fact, on the industry level, the
bullwhip effect had been observed and described by classical economists who dubbed it
the “acceleration principle” since the beginning of the 20th century (Clark 1917).
4The causal mechanisms that drive the bullwhip effect in a given supply chain may
include long lead times, imperfect forecasts, order batching, price variations, and the
interaction of rationing and shortage gaming ((Lee, Padmanabhan et al. 1997), (Simchi-
Levi, Kaminsky et al. 2003)). Yet, Croson and Donohue replicated experimentally the
bullwhip effect in the beer game setting (Sterman 1989) even when all the other
identified operational causes of the bullwhip effect were removed with the exception of
lead time (Croson and Donohue 2006).
Given the convergence in the hypotheses behind the driver of oscillations in supply
chains of durable goods, it is not surprising to note significant qualitative similarities in
the behavior of very different markets. Figure 1 showcases the similarity in pattern
behavior of the shipbuilding industry in Norway at the end of the 19th century and early
20th century and the commercial aircraft industry at the second half of the 20th century.
The total orders for aircraft-seats are superimposed over Einarsen’s observations of
orders for ship capacity in tons and while the underlying economy, location, external
shocks are quite different, they still seem to generate strikingly similar behavior
indicating that internal dynamics may shape system behavior. The next section describes
the key internal and external dynamics present in the commercial aviation industry.
Figure 1: Illustration of similarities in the cyclical behavior of the shipping ordering
cycle in Norway between the years 1893-1913 and the global aircraft ordering cycle
((Einarsen 1938), Boeing and Airbus databases)
2. The Commercial Aviation Business Cycle
Commercial aviation business cycles have a period of 7-10 years similar to the Juglar
equipment investment cycle as described by Schumpeter (Schumpeter 1939). In this type
of cycles, economic growth as a driver of demand, the ordering and retirement of
equipment, and the entry and exit of firms in the different markets are the key variables
that need to be considered which reflects similar observations for the shipping industry
(Stopford 1997)(pg 62). The cyclicality is illustrated by two key industry metrics airline
profitability and order rates plotted in Figures 2 and 3 respectively.
Ship capacity (gross tons) Aircraft seat capacity (000)
Norwegian shipping orders
Global aircraft orders
1893 1913
5Figure 2: Global Airline Profitability in Billion Dollars (data source: (ATA 2006))
Figure 3: Year to year change in global large aircraft orders compared to changes in
demand for air travel (revenue passenger kilometer or RPK) and the gross world
product (Data source: Boeing and Airbus (orders), ATA 2006 (air travel), World
Bank (GDP))
In the transitory period after the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, the following
commoditization dynamics could be seen as driving the oscillations in the industry. The
first effect of deregulation was to allow a number of new entrants. These new entrants
had lower operating costs than incumbent airlines as they operated younger fleets and
their employees had low seniority and commensurate salaries. What they lacked was
network size – a key parameter for attracting passengers. Therefore, a race began to gain
market share and utilize capacity at a disregard for short profitability. This behavior,
although rational in the short-term for a single player, created the illusion that even more
capacity is needed as the lowered prices boosted demand; this was exacerbated by a
growing economy. Airframe manufacturers and, later, leasing firms were happy to oblige
in providing the capacity that was being ordered, despite the mismatch between demand
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6growth and the much higher capacity growth, as that also helped them reduce their unit
costs faster and compete for market share in an oligopolistic market. In addition, airframe
manufacturers, trying 1) to establish market lock-in and 2) go down the steep learning
curve that would give them an edge over their competitors, were engulfed in their own
price war further inducing demand and adding another factor of overcapacity.
Overcapacity inevitably led to price wars and substantial losses but subsidies, mergers,
and bankruptcy protections (Chapter 11 or nationalization) created barriers to exit, thus
retaining a level of overcapacity and allowing for a continuation of the high unit cost
practices by the legacy carriers. Even when carriers failed, their aircraft was re-circulated
as leased or sold to new entrants willing to try their chances. Investors willing to finance
these ventures facilitated this effect.
Two other factors dictated the retention of capacity by airlines: high midterm fixed costs
and the sophisticated pricing capability offered by revenue management systems to
maximize flight passenger revenue. The significant medium-term fixed costs faced by
their operations included the need to “hoard” or retain highly trained employees if the
airline was to remain competitive at the next market upturn while the costs for long-term
leases, owned equipment and gate leases were also fixed in the medium-term. The high
fixed costs made the prospect of price wars more palatable to airline managers as at least
these would ensure a source of badly needed short-term liquidity even at the expense of
profitability and long-term viability (which was usually longer than the time horizon of
high-level management). Revenue management systems also provided a way of filling up
the aircraft at ever higher load factors but at prices that sometimes did not cover the costs
of the operation; the belief that the marginal cost of a seat is zero obscured the fact that in
some cases the prices charged meant that the break-even load factor exceeded one.
In the description above, the key factor in the oscillation is the repeated mismatch
between available capacity and demand in the industry with tight capacity matched by
increased demand and high returns and vice versa. Airlines have flexibility in reducing
available capacity; depending on the time horizon of the decision maker, schedules can
be cut back in the short term and aircraft can be parked, returned to the lessor, sold, or
scrapped in the medium and long term while airlines can go out of business. Yet, this
flexibility is limited by several factors: firstly, an airline’s frequency and network
coverage is a key competitive advantage which is only reluctantly forfeited; secondly,
aircraft are expensive assets that do not produce if underutilized while their lease or
interest and capital payments continue; thirdly, even when an aircraft is returned to the
lessor or sold it will return in the market sooner rather than later; fourthly, airlines
worldwide are recipients of subsidies in different shapes and forms that creates high
barriers to exit.
As a result, aircraft manufacturers emerge as a key stakeholder with the ability to
moderate the influx of capacity in the market. This ability would be moot in a perfectly
competitive market with multiple suppliers but becomes highly influential in a
consolidated market setting. As described earlier, aircraft manufacturers have their own
set of incentives for competing intensely. These include: establishing vendor lock-in for
7airlines that gain from lower operating expenses by flying single-type fleets, fast tracking
the learning curve gains from higher rates of production, and establishing economies of
scale by spreading the high upfront development costs over large productions runs and
economies of scope that support varied product lines. Airlines negotiating for a new
contract can leverage these points in order to play-off the offers between the
manufacturers driving towards competitive pricing similar to a Bertrand equilibrium
outcome5.
In practice though none of the competitive incentives for manufacturers described above
is overwhelmingly effective as that would have led the market to a natural monopoly
equilibrium. In practice, airlines with history of loyalty to one manufacturer may switch
to the other6 while annual production rate change as opposed to cumulative production is
shown to be a better indicator of the learning curve effect as shown by Benkard  in the
study of the Lockheed Tristar (Benkard 2004) and empirically demonstrated by Boeing’s
1997 production problems.
In fact, looking more closely to how Boeing and Airbus adjust their production rates is
revealing a different strategic approach. Piepenbrock pointed to several fundamental
differences between the two manufacturers and argued that there is consistent pattern in
other industries (Piepenbrock 2004). Here we will focus only on the production rate
change strategy difference without consideration of which aspects in their organizational
structure led the respective CEOs to conceive and abide by them in the first place.
In summary, Boeing has historically been oriented towards adjusting production rates to
meet market needs as flexibly as possible while Airbus, on the contrary, has not. This
difference is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows how the volatility of Airbus and Boeing
orders received is similar (Airbus has in fact been receiving more volatile orders) but
Airbus delivery rates are substantially less volatile than Boeing’s. This is corroborated by
the higher backlog7 maintained by Airbus which is allowed to balloon to 12 years or
higher compared to Boeing’s three to four years average. While this difference certainly
impacts the firms themselves and their competitive position, it is not immediately
apparent how it impacts the aviation enterprise as a whole now and in the future and
whether one or the other approach can be leveraged to alleviate some of the worse effects
of the aviation business cycle. To investigate this and a set of alternatives that encompass
the other mechanisms mentioned previously we built the system dynamics simulation
model described below.
                                                 
5 This is a simplistic description as the negotiating power shifts between airlines and manufacturers.
6 To provide two recent examples, British Airways, a loyal Boeing customer ordered Airbus A380 aircraft
while JetBlue, a low-cost-carrier that operated an Airbus-only fleet, ordered Embraer ERJ-190 aircraft.
7 Defined here as years of production needed to deliver existing orders at current production rates.
8Figure 4: Juxtaposition of Boeing and Airbus order and delivery data in total
number of seats (Data source: Boeing and Airbus databases)
3. Modeling the Commercial Aviation Business Cycles
3.1 Existing System Dynamics Modeling Efforts
Given the number of potential factors that can trigger or propagate and amplify
oscillations, it is necessary to model the aviation enterprise in order identify which factors
have the greatest impact and following from there which alternative policies are more
effective. For this purpose, we based our modeling of the industry on the tried structures
used by previous researchers enhancing them with the characteristics needed for our
purpose as described in this section.
Weil adapted a generic commoditization model to represent the commercial aviation
industry. Based on the generic industry model, Weil attributed the excess capacity to the
following set of causes (Weil 1996):
• Over-estimation of demand growth
• Amplification of planning and forecast errors
• Large and increasing number of players
• Lack of adequate financial constrains
• Market liberalization
Skinner et al. also developed an SD model of the airline industry and focused on devising
“cycle management strategies” for a single firm through cycle anticipation,
corresponding growth and competitive behavior, and adding flexibility in areas like
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9aircraft mix, options ordering, and labor (Butler and Keller 1999). Among the strategic
alternatives they proposed were:
• Wet leases
• Fleet age stratification
• Fractional ownership
• Profit-sharing programs
• Code-sharing and alliances to coordinate changes in capacity
Lyneis used a more detailed version of the Weil structure that modeled the used aircraft
markets, leasing firms, and the manufacturers (Lyneis 2000). Using this proprietary
model, Lyneis observed that the reasons for cycles revolve around the inability of the
individual airlines to perceive and act on the information of the industry as a whole as the
significant delays in the major negative feedback loop amplify the variation in economic
conditions by preventing airlines in total to account for the aircraft that are in backlog.
This error is compounded by the use of extrapolation forecasting by airlines and
competition for market share in the upcycle create a situation where the total expected
market share by the airlines exceeds significantly the actual market.
Finally, Liehr et al. developed a parsimonious SD model using similar feedback
structures as the other researcher and, like Skinner et al., focused on the alternatives
available to an individual client airline (Lufthansa) for managing cyclicality (Liehr,
Grossler et al. 2001). They stressed the creation of an organizationally independent
business unit to manage capacity as a prerequisite in any meaningful cycle management
strategy within an airline. In addition, strengthening alliances as a way of introducing
wider capacity controls in the industry was seen as critical if network planning in the
alliance and equalization across regions were to be implemented.
3.2 Expanded Commercial Aviation System Dynamics Model
The model that we developed is based on the tested structures used by the researchers
referenced in Section 3.1. The model represents the dynamic interactions between the
primary stakeholders shown in Figure 5 (aircraft manufacturers, airlines, passengers etc.).
10
Figure 5: Commercial Aviation Enterprise Structure and Model Boundaries
The model is intended to adequately simulate the key dynamics of the industry identified
in the previous section while also allowing for experimentation with alternatives that
would structurally change the system. As a consequence some of the interactions
modeled include:
• the competitive dynamics of a duopolist market for aircraft manufacturers that
includes aircraft pricing, and the effects of economies of scale, scope, and vendor
lock-in.
• the market dynamics of the global airline industry; differing competitive
dynamics affected by the relative barriers to entry and exit and the profitability of
the industry where high level of profitability induces higher entry rate which in
turn suppresses fare prices as competition intensifies. Similarly, orders,
utilization, and retirement of aircraft are dependent on the competitive dynamics;
in a more competitive industry, the desire to fill the available aircraft and
increase load factors in the short term will override the propensity to reduce
capacity in an effort to improve profitability.
• The demand for air transport is dependent on economic and population
conditions on one hand and on the reaction to price levels as demonstrated by the
price elasticity of the consumers of the transport service.
• External effects not captured by the dynamics described previously like fuel
prices and events that disproportionately affect air travel (e.g. a terrorist attack,
regional war, or a pandemic) compared to their impact on the economy as a
whole.
These dynamics are presented in a causal loop diagram format in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: High level causal loop diagram of the major interactions in the
commercial aviation model
3.3. Calibration and Validation of the System Dynamics Commercial Aviation Simulation
Model
The commercial aviation system dynamics model that was summarized in the previous
section was intended for high level policy analysis rather than detailed forecasting. The
calibration process used a combination of historical data-derived parameter values based
on econometric estimation, published estimates of specific parameters, and, in the case of
parameters where existing estimates were not available or were qualitative in nature, a
reasonable estimate was used accompanied by sensitivity analysis. In addition, the
model’s modular structure allowed for a sequential calibration/verification of each
module by separating them and feeding historical data as inputs and monitoring the
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outputs compared to the historical expected values. Given the tight interactions between
modules, this was an iterative convergence process.
The calibration against historical data used 1984 as the starting year as by that time many
of the current features of the industry were in the process of being established:
• airline deregulation in the US market was well under way,
• LCCs were introduced and growing (Southwest, People Express etc)
• Yield management systems started to become widespread
• Airbus had carved a niche for itself in the widebody aircraft category and was
about to introduce its narrowbody family
For this reason the mid-eighties is a good starting point for the system dynamic model as
it gives ample historical data for further calibration and does not have to account for big
differences in industry structure.
The key parameters used for calibration against historical data were:
• Airline total demand, operating capacity, and load factors
• Airline revenues, costs, and profit margins
• Airline orders and manufacturer backlog (aircraft delivery lead times are captured
with backlog)
In Figure 7, we show a sample of these parameters for airlines comparing model results
against the historical data.
Figure 7: Historic vs. model output data used for model calibration and validation
To confirm the visual indications of close similarity between the modeled and historical
data, we also conducted a set of statistical tests for these key parameters summarized in
Table 1. For all parameters the hypothesis that the model results are not significantly
different statistically than the data distribution could not be rejected. We also notice from
the fact that the Uc Theil statistic is greater than Um and Us that there is a phase shift
between the model results and the historical data but does not give information as to the
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relative magnitude. By inspection, this phase shift is less than one year which is a small
time frame for the time-scales that we are considering. On the same topic, Sterman (p.
877) notes that the system type we are considering -- a combination of supply chains and
commodity markets – “selectively amplify certain frequencies in the random shocks that
constantly perturb them. Since no model can capture all the random variations in the
environment, model dynamics can diverge from the data even if the model is perfectly
specified” (emphasis in the original) (Sterman 2000).
Table 1: Statistical tests comparing the Historic Data Distribution (d) with the
model output data (m)
Theil statistics
Variable
Mean
d
Mean
m
Sqrt
(MSE) R sq. Um Us Uc
P(T<=t)
two-tail
Statistically
significant
difference
at 0.05
Capacity (in trillion
op. ASM) 2.03 2.03 0.077 0.981 0.001 0.153 0.845 0.986 No
Demand (in trillion
RPM) 1.39 1.39 0.061 0.975 0.004 0.007 0.989 0.976 No
Load factors 0.68 0.68 0.02 0.430 0.019 0.002 0.979 0.718 No
Airline costs in ($B) 101 98.9 5 0.959 0.172 0.246 0.582 0.730 No
Airline revenues 103 101.1 5.2 0.949 0.152 0.185 0.663 0.735 No
Airline profit margins 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.663 0.003 0.000 0.997 0.916 No
Aircraft orders (in
trillion ASM) 0.21 0.19 0.067 0.628 0.081 0.095 0.824 0.531 No
Aircraft backlog (in
trillion ASM) 0.61 0.63 0.164 0.636 0.019 0.111 0.871 0.771 No
Finally, in order to create a meaningful background for experiments, we projected the key
driving parameter variables (i.e. gross world product and population, fuel prices and
external factors) to 2024 using three scenarios named Global Village (a continuation of
the current status with historical growth rates  and relatively stable fuel prices), Islands of
Sufficiency (a reduction in GWP historical growth rates and an increase in fuel prices that
drive more regional reliance and a reduction in demand for long-distance travel), and
Growth and Overshoot (the fast paced growth continues for some years until it reaches
hard resource constraints causing a dramatic collapse in economic output and desire to
travel). We used these scenarios as a way to conduct sensitivity analysis for the
effectiveness of the different strategic alternatives that tested as described in the
following section.
4. Mitigating the effects of the business cycle in Commercial Aviation
We structured our experimental investigation into two sections; one focused on
understanding the relative impact of the endogenous structure of the industry as opposed
to the exogenous influences while the second specifically examined the effectiveness of
different potential strategic alternatives in mitigating the effects of the business cycle that
is generating higher value for the different industry stakeholders than the baseline.
14
4.1 Endogenous vs. Exogenous Effects
We experimented with the relative effect of external factors versus the endogenous
structure of the industry. The experiments consisted of stabilizing all but one exogenous
parameter at a time and comparing in turn, their relative impact on the industry cycle. We
also considered the impact of differences in the internal structure of the industry. We
used the coefficient of variation in airline profitability and ordering rates as the metrics
for comparison and the results are summarized in Table 2, where a higher value indicates
a more volatile environment.8
Table 2: Coefficient of variation* of airline profitability and aircraft orders
investigating the relative effect of external factors and industry structure
Experiment Airline
Profitability
Aircraft
Orders
1. All exogenous factors variable (baseline) 1.10 0.86
2. Only fuel prices variable 0.88 0.53
3. Only economic output variable 0.74 0.71
4. Only external events variable 0.67 0.58
5. No exogenous factors variable and consolidated airline industry 0.56 0.53
6. No exogenous factors variable and competitive airline industry 0.64 0.53
* A higher value of the coefficient of variation indicates a more volatile/cyclical behavior
We found that the volatile fuel prices impact airline profitability but not aircraft orders as
much. This is because in a competitive industry, a large fraction of the downward fare
fluctuation is absorbed as losses and do not seriously impact customer demand that is the
primary driver for aircraft orders. The economic cycle on the other hand has a deeper
effect upstream in the supply chain while the external events (terrorism etc) are a distant
third in their impact as drivers of a cycle.
More importantly, we show that for a consolidated industry, an industry that effectively
acts as an oligopoly that allows for economic profits, the disequilibrium of the initial
conditions is dampened. This is not the case if the airline industry is competitive and with
active entries and exits in the industry. In this case, even in the absence of other external
factors the structure of the industry perpetuates a endogenous cycle in profitability. The
effects of these internal dynamics amplify external signals generating the status quo of a
notoriously cyclical industry. Liehr et al. (2001) had reached a similar conclusion running
contrary to the conventional wisdom of industry leaders that attributed the plight of the
industry to the exogenous rather than the endogenous drivers. The significant potential of
endogenous change is highlighted in the following sections.
4.2 Evaluating strategic alternatives for mitigating the effects of the commercial aviation
business cycle
A prerequisite step in evaluating the impact of strategic alternatives on the value
delivered to different stakeholders is the definition of representative value functions for
                                                 
8 As the experiments are deterministic and replicable probabilistic analysis was not necessary in this case.
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the stakeholders and metrics that reflect them. In our case, these are summarized in Table
3.
Table 3: Representative value functions and metrics for the key commercial aviation
stakeholders
For this paper, we assume that long-term returns are prioritized for the capital marketsand
and for the government stakeholders. For the latter, the combination of long-term
economic return stability and high availability of air travel also implies employment
stability for an industry where labor input per aircraft flight is regulated by minimum
requirements. As a result, the value functions for these two stakeholders can be derived
from the satisfaction of the value functions of the top three stakeholders in Table 3, which
we use as proxies for evaluating the different strategic alternatives.
Based on the dynamics discussed in Section 2, we considered a number of conceivably
feasible strategic alternatives, which we summarize in Table 4. The evaluation process
consisted in running experiments of activating a single alternative at a time. Next, a set of
experiments with promising combinations of strategic alternatives was tried. In order to
explore as large a portion of the solution space as possible, an automated optimization
process was implemented to generate a solution space of multiple combinations of
strategic alternatives and clarify how individual alternatives fared against bundles of
alternatives. The final step was to consider the feasibility of strategic alternatives given
non-modeled considerations (e.g. political will, probability of successful deployment,
coordination levels required across stakeholders that could be considered as collusion and
not viable in a regulated free market environment etc.). In all cases, the desired objective
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was to ‘satisfice’ with a solution that performs well across stakeholders (symbiotic) and
requires minimum, if any, political intervention or collaboration among actors.
Table 4: List of strategic alternatives evaluated
Mechanism Strategic Alternative Description
Profit Sharing and Outsourcing: Investigates the transfer of fixed operating costs to
variable via profit-sharing agreements and service outsourcing as a way to defer
costs in a downcycle.Fixed to variable
costs Leasing Variation: Investigates the effect of more flexible ownership costs offered by
leasing
Flexibility in Aircraft Fleet Utilization: Investigates how different aircraft utilization
strategies affect cyclicality.Operational fleet
management Aircraft retirement patterns: Investigates how a change in the aircraft retirement
patterns affects the commercial aviation enterprise.
Supply chain visibility: Investigates reductions in ‘supply chain discounting’ or the
observed phenomenon (acutely in the airline industry) of collectively ordering as if
the backlog of orders in the supply chain is non-existent.
Demand Forecasting: Investigates changes in forecasting: how smoother forecasts
affect the cycle.Fl
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Aircraft ordering
patterns
Adjusting the Effect of Profitability on Order Patterns: Presents the effects of
moderating ordering ‘exuberance’ in profitable for airlines periods and commensurate
dearth of orders in a high loss period.
Yield
management
policies
Investigates how different assumptions in the airline yield management strategies
may influence cyclicality.
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ne
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Changes in
airline barriers to
entry and exit
Examines the effect of changing the barriers to enter and exit the airline industry
which are controlled by the regulators and financiers:
Competitive vs. regulated markets:
Lower barriers to entry and higher barriers to exit
Higher barriers to entry and lower barriers to exit
Competitive
strategies
Considers individual manufacturer action that does not require any leader/follower
game.
Coordinated
strategies
Assuming manufacturer cooperation
Aircraft pricing
Investigates the effect of coordinated and competitive changes in aircraft pricing:
Monopolistic pricing
Signal pricing: attempt to induce airlines to buy more or less by drastic changes in
aircraft price
Competitive: highly competitive pricing
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Production rate
adjustments
Investigates the effect of coordinated and competitive changes in aircraft production
rates:
Just-In-Time delivery (very responsive aircraft deliveries)
Quick production rate adjustments (similar to the current Boeing production strategy)
Slow production rate adjustments (similar to the current Airbus production strategy)
Pre-determined production schedules pegged at long-term aviation growth rates
A striking conclusion from evaluating the different strategic alternatives is that
controlling capacity was in all cases instrumental for positive outcomes. Interestingly, the
one solution that did not require either explicit collusion or changes in the regulatory
environment was the implementation by the manufacturer that represented Boeing to
follow a slow to adjust production planning strategy similar to the one used to model
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Airbus’s behavior as shown in the selective results summary in Table 5. In Table 5 we
present the results that provided significant (>3% difference) changes from the baseline
results.
Table 5: Indicative results summary for strategic alternatives with positive impacts
Notes:
Results that are significantly positive are shaded darker (green) and those that were significantly negative
shaded lighter (yellow).
NPV: Net Present Value
CV: Coefficient of Variation for the metric. A positive CV change means that the metric is more volatile
(cyclical) than its baseline value
The positive impact of the adoption of slow production rate adjustments by Boeing and
the continuation of that strategy by Airbus provides strong positive returns for both
manufacturers and airlines while only marginally affecting the passenger welfare by
reducing ticket prices (primarily as a result of lower production costs) and slightly
increasing load factors (a relative disadvantage if used as proxy for service levels but at
the same time performing much better than the other promising solutions in that metric).
Another important observation that can be drawn from these results is that the just-in-
time aircraft delivery strategic alternative that calls for lead times of less than six months
from order placement to aircraft delivery, even when bundled with other positive
strategic alternatives like lean manufacturing to ensure reductions in manufacturing costs
and supply chain visibility, fails to offer a symbiotic outcome as it provides benefits to
airlines but it still takes a toll on the manufacturers that cannot reduce their costs fast
enough to compensate for the erratic order placement of the airlines and at least in the
timeframe that we examined, there does not seem to create a positive reduction in the
cyclicality of the industry.
These results are robust even against the large solution space provided by bundling of
strategic alternatives as shown in Figure 8. There the strategic alternative that calls for
Boeing to adapt Airbus’s production strategy is dominated by only a handful of bundles
while the (unrealistic and costly for passengers) fixed production strategy is clearly on
the Pareto front.
NPV 
Change
CV 
change
NPV 
Change
Order CV 
Change
Fare 
Change
LF 
change
75% SC visibility 256.4% 54.0% -45.6% 41.8% 2.6% 13.8%
50% SC visibility 168.7% 47.3% -38.9% 31.5% 2.7% 9.5%
MF fixed prod. Rate 49.6% -23.4% 123.3% N/A -0.3% 2.8%
Slow prod rate change 25.6% -2.6% 63.7% -43.5% -0.8% 1.3%
Slow prod rate change + 25%SC visibility 142.2% 50.5% 4.3% 5.3% 2.2% 7.4%
MF JIT+ lean + 25% SC visibility 90.6% 41.9% -40.2% 25.4% 3.6% 5.2%
Airline Manufacturers Passengers
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Figure 8: Impacts of bundled strategic alternatives in two dimensions for the airline
and aircraft manufacturer stakeholders against single the symbiotic
Note: Symbiotic solutions reside on the upper right quadrant as it is there that the benefits are positive for
both the airlines and the manufacturers compared to the baseline.
4.3 Discussion
Aircraft manufacturers face a prisoner’s dilemma kind of problem in their decision to
adjust capacities independent of orders to optimize for long-term performance. They have
an incentive for adjusting production rates fast enough so that they can cater to airline
demand and avoid losing orders due to delays. On the other hand, they would both be
better off if they adjusted production rates slowly. The emergence of a third manufacturer
for large scale aircraft facilitated by both incumbents following the same slow adjustment
strategy and carrying large backlogs was not modeled. It is an unlikely event for the
immediate future based on technical and economic considerations constraining credible
entry proposition but cannot be dismissed in the long-term. The key to compete
effectively even with large backlogs may lie with the uncertainty of orders in the backlog;
as airlines place phantom orders, their slots may be exchanged or auctioned if and when
they are cancelled.
There were other strategic alternatives that provided relatively strong positive results for
one group of stakeholders. These alternatives included the consolidation of the airline
industry, the consolidation of aircraft ordering to more closely match demand growth
rates, reduction of aircraft delivery lead times, or price collusion between the two aircraft
manufacturers. In all of these cases, the positive results were counterbalanced by
deterioration in the metrics for the rest of the industry stakeholders.
The attractiveness of the most promising strategic alternative that we identified, the
slower production adjustment for the manufacturers, lies with i) its simplicity, as it does
not involve coordinated action and rests only with one set of stakeholders – the
manufacturers, ii) its Pareto efficiency, as we discuss above it is the only single
alternative that does not significantly diminish the benefits to other stakeholders, and iii)
its effectiveness, as the resulting effect is close to the Pareto front of combination
alternatives. Given that Airbus has historically followed this alternative, it should be
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stressed that the simulated Boeing gained significantly when it follows this alternative; in
our experiments this benefits amounted to slightly less than 90% increase in the net
present value of its gross profitability for the 1984-2025 period over the baseline. For
Airbus the effect of this action is also positive but expectedly offering less of an
improvement.
In the beginning of 2008, we high order backlogs across the board for bothe
manufacturers. These backlogs can be attributed to the recent delays in the major new
aircraft programs for both manufacturers, the Airbus A380 and A350XWB and the
Boeing 787, as well as the surge in orders that was fueled by the rapid growth of the
developing world markets in China, India, and the Middle East and the profitable 2005-
2007 period for the US and European airlines. Given this situation, it is possible that both
manufacturers are pressured to increase production rates. Evidence to this effect can be
seen by recent increases in the production capacity for the A320 line by Airbus. If Boeing
follows suit with ramping capacity in the 737 line and especially the 787 line then it is
possible that the industry is setting itself up for another big swing of the cycle. This may
come in a time where demand for air travel is affected by fare prices that have to follow
the rising fuel prices, potential carbon regulations that impact aviation, and a generally
slow economic climate. Based on the above, our recommendation would be for both
manufacturers to resist the temptation of quickly ramping up capacity even at the cost of
penalties for promised deliveries – it may be the more beneficial path across the aviation
stakeholder board in the long term.
5. Conclusions
We demonstrated experimentally, using a customized system dynamics model of the
commercial aviation industry, that reducing the lead times of delivery, improving
forecasting by smoothing it over longer periods to better capture the trend, greater
number of cancellations, or even allowing for greater pricing power of the airlines all
have substantially lower impact on modulating the profitability cycle than simply
ordering with full accounting of the aircraft in backlog. If this function is carried out by
airlines though, the outcome for aircraft manufacturers is not Pareto-efficient as their
profitability is reduced and the actual volatility of orders is increased. Instead we found
that the most promising symbiotic alternative lies with the adoption of slow production
rate adjustments by both manufacturers and the rate of production adjustments is key in
improving returns (and reducing cyclicality) in this system. It should be noted that
passengers do not face deterioration of costs in this case as it is the increased production
efficiency that contributes to the increased value rather than increases in fare prices. The
probability of a new entrant in the large commercial aircraft industry is remote in the
short term but can be an issue if this strategy is followed in the longer term, especially
when combined with radical technological innovation.
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